An Adversarial Ethics of Campaigns and Elections by Bagg, Samuel & Tranvik, Isak
1 
An Adversarial Ethics of Campaigns and Elections 
Samuel Bagg (Oxford) and Isak Tranvik (Duke) 
 
NB: This is the final pre-publication draft of an article that has now been published in Perspectives 
on Politics. If you have access through your institution, please download the published version 
here (doi: 10.1017/S1537592719002639). If not, you may access a read-only copy of the final 




Abstract: Existing approaches to campaign ethics fail to adequately account for the “arms races” 
incited by competitive incentives in the absence of effective sanctions for destructive behaviors. 
By recommending scrupulous devotion to unenforceable norms of honesty, these approaches 
require ethical candidates either to quit or lose. To better understand the complex dilemmas faced 
by candidates, therefore, we turn first to the tradition of “adversarial ethics,” which aims to enable 
ethical participants to compete while preventing the most destructive excesses of competition. As 
we demonstrate, however, elections present even more difficult challenges than other adversarial 
contexts, because no centralized regulation is available to halt potential arms races. Turning next 
to recent scholarship on populism and partisanship, we articulate an alternative framework for 
campaign ethics, which allows candidates greater room to maneuver in their appeals to democratic 
populations while nevertheless requiring adherence to norms of social and political pluralism. 
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Introduction 
“When they go low,” Michelle Obama announced to roaring applause at the 2016 Democratic 
National Convention, “we go high.” It was the most memorable line of her speech, if not the entire 
convention, and it soon became a slogan for supporters of Hillary Clinton’s unsuccessful bid for 
the US presidency. “Going low” was a reference to a barrage of unsavory tactics employed by 
Clinton’s Republican opponent, Donald Trump, while “going high” was posited as the appropriate 
response to Trump’s “ugliness” (Hellmann 2016). Indeed, the idea of going high functioned as a 
kind of rallying cry among liberal elites seeking to defend democracy from what they perceived to 
be an existential threat. But is it the right thing to do? 
That, roughly, is the question we ask in this article. We do not analyze the 2016 election in any 
detail, and we do not comment on whether concerns about the death of democracy were well 
founded in that instance. Instead, we treat the widespread recent discussion of these issues as an 
invitation to think through a fundamental theoretical question of political ethics, whose relevance 
is far broader than a single campaign: What kinds of normative considerations ought to guide or 
constrain the strategic choices facing candidates for political office in a democracy? What means 
can well-intentioned candidates use in their quest to win elections, without threatening the 
democratic norms on which the value of elections depends? 
We are not alone in our conviction that this question deserves serious consideration—
especially in our current political moment. Facing the disturbing spread of “authoritarian 
backsliding” around the world (Dresden and Howard 2016), many political scientists warn that 
growing polarization—often compounded by campaign tactics meant to mobilize voters—may 
endanger democratic norms (Mickey, Levitsky, and Way 2017). Yet the question of how 
candidates should conduct themselves in campaigns is rarely considered in political ethics and 
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democratic theory. Among the few existing accounts of campaign ethics, meanwhile, none has 
properly accounted for the inherently adversarial nature of elections. 
As scholars in the tradition of “adversarial ethics” observe, competitive practices like sports, 
trials, and markets present special ethical dilemmas, because they often incentivize or even require 
behaviors of participants that are normally considered unethical. Although few would ban such 
practices outright, we also do not want to cede these competitions to actors who are willing to 
sacrifice ethical principles to succeed. Adversarial ethicists outline two possible strategies for 
avoiding this perverse result: either excusing the unethical behavior, thereby enabling ethical 
participants to compete on equal terms, or disincentivizing it through reliably costly sanctions 
(Applbaum 2000; Heath 2006; Singer 2018).  
Elections give rise to a similar dilemma: although they present strong incentives for otherwise 
unethical adversarial behavior, few see this as a reason to abandon electoral competition altogether. 
Previous accounts of campaign ethics, however—which are focused primarily on candidate 
honesty—rarely if ever excuse unethical behaviors on the campaign trail; in fact, they usually 
conclude that candidates have stronger ethical duties than ordinary citizens. Neither do they 
consider how deceptive behaviors might be effectively disincentivized. In real-world democracies, 
therefore, such idealized accounts of campaign ethics threaten to have perverse consequences. If 
some forms of dishonesty are electorally beneficial—as the widespread use of deceptive tactics 
suggests—then candidates who persist in upholding perfect honesty will likely be weeded out of 
the competition, ceding the electoral process to the least scrupulous.1  
                                                          
1 We cannot definitely prove whether such strategies are, in fact, effective. However, most candidates appear to believe 
they are, and as we discuss later, there are good reasons for this belief. As such, we are interested in the theoretical 
questions that arise when such strategies are effective or when candidates reasonably believe they are.  
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We propose a different framework for grappling with the important questions facing candidates 
for office. Existing accounts have emphasized honesty because they seek to preserve a pristine 
principal-agent relationship between citizens and elected officials. In our view, however, this 
idealized model of the citizen-officeholder relation is naïve, and no real-world democracy could 
even approximate it.2 If theories of campaign ethics are to be useful to candidates, as we believe 
they should, they must be oriented toward a more realistic account of the value and aims of 
democratic institutions.3 Although it is beyond the scope of this article to articulate such an 
account, we follow “democratic realists” in assuming that the actual virtues of democracy have 
more to do with the beneficial effects of party competition than with accurate reflection of a 
coherent popular will (Bagg 2018b; Przeworski 1999, 2010, 2018; Shapiro 1999, 2016).4 
Accordingly, we propose an account of campaign ethics centered on preserving the benefits of this 
competition for all members of the community—or, in other words, on the values of social and 
political pluralism.  
Unlike the ideal of preserving principal-agent representation through scrupulous candidate 
honesty—which is both impossible to achieve and unnecessary for democratic politics—defending 
pluralism is at once within our grasp and essential to the real value of democracy. Unlike existing 
honesty-focused accounts, moreover, our pluralist account of campaign ethics is directly addressed 
to the most important category of ethical dilemmas that candidates are actually likely to face. In 
                                                          
2 As we explain in more detail later, there are a number of reasons for skepticism about the principal-agent model, 
including empirical evidence about typical voter behavior and theoretical models of social choice procedures. For an 
overview, see Achen and Bartels 2016. 
3 In this sense, our account is broadly aligned with a recent turn in political philosophy toward modes of theorizing 
that are “realistic” as opposed to “idealized” or “moralized”; see Galston 2010. This turn is associated with distinct 
but overlapping literatures on political realism and non-ideal theory, and our approach certainly has affinities with 
work in both traditions. However, the precise meaning of terms like “realism” are hotly contested (Baderin 2014; Sleat 
2016), and we do not have space to position our approach in relation to any specific account, although see  Bagg 2016, 
2018c. As a result, we are satisfied to note a shared orientation, in a broad sense, toward more realistic theorizing.  
4 In a more general sense, our approach is also aligned with a turn toward “realistic” approaches to democratic theory; 
see Green 2009; Maloy 2013; Medearis 2015. 
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particular, when a candidate’s substantive goals are ethically valuable—and the interesting 
dilemmas of campaign ethics arise only when they are or could be—serious normative trade-offs 
may arise between the obligation to attain these valuable ends and the obligation to sustain healthy 
democratic norms and procedures. Only our pluralist account addresses these trade-offs head-on. 
Of course, the framework we propose can hardly claim to resolve all such dilemmas. Indeed, 
we offer only preliminary suggestions about the substantive recommendations that follow from 
such a framework: our primary task is to shift the focus of campaign ethics, more generally, from 
honesty to pluralism, and that requires most of our attention. Nevertheless, our account has three 
crucial advantages over its rivals. First, norms against anti-pluralism are more likely to be 
enforceable through decentralized sanctions, meaning that candidates can follow them without 
ceding the field to the least scrupulous competitors. Second, even when such decentralized 
enforcement fails—which it certainly does from time to time—abiding by these norms is still less 
likely to harm the electoral fortunes of well-meaning candidates than maintaining strict honesty. 
Third and finally, upholding pluralism is ultimately more crucial for safeguarding the benefits of 
democratic institutions. As a result, we conclude that our pluralist approach to campaign ethics 
provides more reliable action guidance to ethical candidates who seek to achieve valuable 
substantive ends while preserving and extending democracy.  
Campaign Ethics: The Limits of Existing Accounts 
Although there is an extensive body of literature dedicated to examining which campaign strategies 
and tactics are most effective, relatively little work has sought to establish what strategies and 
tactics count as ethical. Meanwhile, those who have addressed the topic have emphasized 
candidate honesty, in service of an implicit principal-agent model of representative politics. For 
instance, Stephen Medvic and Dale Miller endorse a “civic responsibility” approach to campaign 
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ethics. Because they believe “campaigns are public debates about how society should operate,” 
Medvic and Miller argue that candidates “must act according to standards that encourage rational 
decision-making by voters” (2002, 28). For campaign discourse to be ethical, then, it must “expose 
the arguments of both sides,” “facilitate the identification of distortions and of false statements of 
fact,” and clearly state candidates’ “views and intentions” (28).5 While acknowledging the 
difficulties of adhering to such a standard, Medvic and Miller conclude it is preferable because “it 
better serves the public good” than the alternatives they consider (34). 
Other accounts focus less on the generalized quality of public debate and more on the specific 
claims made by candidates for public office, but they also emphasize that the honest transmission 
of information is crucial for democratic government. L. Sandy Maisel, for instance, argues that 
candidates must be “open and honest” so that voters can make an informed choice about who best 
represents their interests (2002, 44). If voters do not know what their representatives will do once 
in office, he claims, elections cannot legitimize the authoritative decisions of public officials. 
Keena Lipsitz, meanwhile, draws on theories of deliberative democracy to argue that candidates 
must give “reasons for positions taken,” “be consistent,” “be civil,” “engage the arguments of 
others,” and “speak to the concerns of all constituents” (2004, 174). When candidates fail to follow 
these guidelines, she argues, voters cannot make informed and reasonable choices about who best 
represents them. Like Maisel, then, Lipsitz believes that the legitimacy of representative 
democracy depends on forthright communication between candidates and ordinary citizens. 
In the most recent treatment of the subject, Eric Beerbohm argues that candidates in democratic 
elections regularly solicit trust from citizens by making truth claims, as well as “second-personal,” 
“promissory” speech acts (2016, 395–96). Thinking of campaign discourse in this way, Beerbohm 
                                                          
5 This list is not exhaustive. The authors note that these criteria were originally developed by Stanley Kelly Jr.  
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argues, “has the potential to alter the agency relationship of citizens to their lawmakers, guarding 
against the inherent vulnerability of the ordinary citizen in a representative system” (405). As a 
result, candidates are morally obligated not to exhibit behaviors, such as lying, bullshitting, 
pandering, mudslinging, and strategic ambiguity, which might betray the trust that protects the 
citizen from the “power imbalances built into representative democracy” (382) . Beerbohm’s 
“relational model” emphasizes the trust solicited by candidates’ statements, rather than the 
information they convey. But it still requires nearly perfect honesty of candidates as a strict 
condition of democratic legitimacy because of its reliance on a principal-agent model of citizen-
candidate relationships in a democracy. Although Medvic and Miller, Maisel, and Lipsitz do not 
explicitly endorse a similar principal-agent model, each of their accounts seems to be underpinned 
by it: voters need accurate information to make electoral decisions that reflect their interests. 
Because campaigns are the primary mechanism by which that information is transmitted, they must 
be conducted in an open and honest manner.  
Given the dearth of attention devoted to campaigns in democratic theory, especially 
considering their central importance in most citizens’ experience of democracy, these 
contributions are laudable. Indeed, we endorse the common thread that weaves them together: 
candidates make claims that citizens rightly expect them to uphold. In our view, however, these 
accounts do not sufficiently account for two crucial features of elections, which any useful, non-
self-undermining guidance to candidates must account for. The first is that campaigns are largely 
unregulated and highly competitive. The second is that the outcome of elections often has very 
significant moral weight. As we shall see, it is the combination of these two features that makes 
campaign ethics a uniquely difficult problem. In fact, the problem is unresolvable if one’s account 
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of campaign ethics is designed to protect the principal-agent relationship between citizens and 
representatives.  
We are not the first to note that campaigns are competitive affairs nor that this aspect of liberal 
democratic government is critical to its value. Perhaps most famously, Joseph Schumpeter (1942) 
argued that democracy’s normative appeal is largely a function of its hotly contested elections. 
And although Schumpeter’s elite-driven model is generally unpopular among normative theorists, 
many maintain the more general principle that competition of some kind is both necessary and 
desirable (Connolly 1991; Kirshner 2016; Medearis 2015; Mouffe 2005; Shapiro 1999). We agree 
with such authors that competition is essential to democratic government, because it strengthens 
the state’s resistance to capture at the hands of any particular elite or faction (Bagg 2018b). We 
also recognize, however, that competitive incentives can generate “arms races” that erode 
democratic norms and institutions. If we are to endorse and encourage competition as an integral 
part of democratic politics, therefore, we must devote more attention to forestalling such dynamics 
before they threaten democracy from within. 
Existing efforts to theorize campaign ethics yield few resources for solving this problem. 
Because they say little about what ethical candidates should do when their opponent refuses to 
play by the theorists’ rules, they fail to address what we believe to be the central ethical dilemma 
facing real candidates in real democracies: how to weigh the demands of justice and other 
substantive ends against the imperative of maintaining healthy democratic procedures.6 
Fortunately, however, we need not start from scratch: ethicists of sports, law, and business have 
                                                          
6 We do not mean to imply that there is no value in considering the attitudes or character of individual candidates. 
Indeed, we are sympathetic to efforts stressing a more flexible virtue ethics (as opposed to deontological) approach to 
campaigns, such as that of Galston (1991). That said, we believe that we cannot rely on candidates alone to do what 
they are supposed to. The benefits of cheating are too high and the costs too low, while the stakes are often enormous. 
As such, we must attempt to establish norms that can be enforced with decentralized sanctions. Although Galston 
appears to gesture toward such standards (195), he does not articulate them in any detail and does not explicitly address 
the difficulty of decentralized enforcement. 
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been grappling with similar dilemmas for some time in a burgeoning literature known as 
“adversarial ethics,” and we can learn a great deal by applying this framework to the ethics of 
campaigns and elections. 
Adversarial Ethics: Realistic Principles for the Playing Field, the Courtroom, and the 
Market 
The observation that motivates the study of adversarial ethics is that in adversarial contexts 
such as sports, jury trials and competitive markets, we sometimes allow or even endorse certain 
behaviors that are otherwise considered unethical. As in democratic elections, competition can be 
beneficial in these domains, yet adversarial ethicists also recognize that in creating incentives to 
engage in otherwise unethical behavior, adversarial institutions carry their fair share of dangers. If 
highly compensated defense attorneys are so committed to exonerating their clients that they are 
willing to go beyond misleading cross-examinations and actually fabricate evidence, for instance, 
juries have no reliable way to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. Similarly, the more 
businesspeople attempt to generate monopoly rents or exploit market failures, the fewer benefits 
competitive markets will have for society. The challenge of adversarial ethics is thus to excuse 
certain competitive behaviors while effectively disincentivizing those that are purely destructive. 
How can destructive behaviors be reliably prevented? First, of course, the sincerely held ethical 
principles of competitors can always inhibit foul play without regard to external incentives. 
Cyclists, for instance, may refrain from doping simply because they consider it immoral, even if it 
is in their “interest” to take banned substances. Second, informal norms enforced by decentralized 
sanctions may also govern competitors’ behavior. Codes of sportsmanship, for example, 
effectively induce soccer players to kick the ball out of bounds when an opponent gets injured and 
MMA fighters to stop immediately when their opponents tap out. Third, finally, there are formal 
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rules in sports, trials, and markets—often designed to limit the harms of competition—that are 
enforced by an impartial referee, judge, or regulator. 
In our view, a key contribution of the adversarial ethics approach is the recognition that 
different kinds of constraints are appropriate in different circumstances, and, in particular, that 
there are often serious limits on the effectiveness of the first two mechanisms: i.e., ethical 
principles and informal norms (Norman 2011; Singer 2018: 251–54). If an unethical behavior like 
doping confers a large enough advantage, for instance, it is only a matter of time before some 
athletes adopt it. Once that happens, even those who initially avoided the behavior must follow 
suit or drop out of the competition, ceding the field to the unscrupulous. If the benefits of the 
behavior are substantial enough, the situation is ripe for an arms race dynamic, in which all 
competitors must keep up with the unethical behavior of violators to stay in the game.  
In sports, law, and business, this is precisely when recourse to the third strategy— 
formalization of rules and centralization of enforcement—is often required. Preventing an arms 
race can be very difficult without formal rules and centralized authority to enforce them. As codes 
of sportsmanship demonstrate, informal norms may effectively constrain competitors, but there is 
a reason that such codes do not require athletes to seriously endanger their chances of winning. 
Once a socially destructive strategy becomes too advantageous, the incentives for victory will 
begin to outweigh the limited costs of violating informal codes. Rather than subjecting competitors 
to such temptation, therefore, we try to make these strategies formally illegal. 
What, then, is the obligation of ethical athletes or businesspeople when they discover an 
opportunity to gain some advantage by unethical means? First of all, clearly, they should abstain 
from taking advantage of it themselves. From an ethical perspective, at least, it is obvious that they 
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should not act immorally simply because it is in their interest to do so. Yet unless it goes beyond 
this minimal recommendation, adversarial ethics will be condemned to irrelevance.  
If there are no centrally enforced rules, after all, it does not matter how many principled cyclists 
refuse to engage in doping. Eventually, someone will start taking banned substances. Given the 
arms race dynamic discussed earlier, doping will sooner or later become necessary for victory. As 
a result, an ethical approach  recommending only that competitors abstain from such profitable but 
destructive practices is a pointless (if not counterproductive) enterprise. In our view, an adversarial 
ethics that aspires to be impactful must offer more than this abstinence-only approach. It must also 
require actors to identify potential arms race dynamics and try to halt them before they get out of 
hand. 
An ethical businessperson who encounters an opportunity to profit through some socially 
destructive practice, for instance, should not stand by and wait for her company to be driven into 
bankruptcy by the first unscrupulous competitor to discover and exploit it. In addition to abstaining 
from the practice herself, she must also try to change the circumstances that render it profitable; 
that is, she should try to raise the costs of engaging in that destructive practice. This may mean 
advocating informal norms, like codes of sportsmanship, or making semiformal agreements to 
“self-regulate” among the relevant competitors. If the incentives for violating these norms are too 
high, however, or if decentralized enforcement is unlikely to be effective, then the relevant actors 
may be incapable of preventing an arms race by themselves. In such cases, it becomes the ethical 
businessperson’s duty to lobby for formal, centralized enforcement.7 
                                                          
7 Abraham Singer puts it this way: “We should think of businesses as having a moral obligation to pursue the types of 
regulation or professional agreements that would allow them to do the ethical thing that is otherwise strategically 
precluded” (2018, 252). 
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Campaigns and Elections as Adversarial Institutions 
An Adversarial Approach to Campaign Ethics: Promises and Challenges 
Some of the dilemmas facing candidates in competitive elections, we submit, are structurally 
similar to those faced by ethical businesspeople. As campaign ethicists have pointed out, deceptive 
and dishonest tactics such as lying, pandering, misdirection, waffling, and incivility can have 
serious negative consequences. Yet such behaviors may also be “profitable” in electoral terms: 
indeed, certain campaign environments will be ripe for arms races in which all candidates use 
increasingly “dirty” tactics to keep up with their rivals, while those who eschew these tactics are 
more likely to be left behind.8 That is what previous approaches to campaign ethics have neglected 
to account for: not simply that destructive behaviors are sometimes rational but also that there may 
be circumstances where refusing to partake prevents ethical actors from remaining in the 
competition at all. Under such circumstances, only those who make unethical choices will even be 
presented with such choices again—and in this way, making ethical choices becomes actively self-
undermining.9 
We argue that adopting an adversarial approach can help us understand the responsibilities of 
candidates in such situations. More specifically, the responsibility of candidates to avoid profitable 
but destructive behaviors should be theorized on a continuum along with feasible ways of altering 
the circumstances that make those behaviors “profitable” in the first place. An ethical candidate 
should not deceive her potential constituents without reason, of course, but she should also not 
                                                          
8 Clearly, many local and regional elections are not subject to arms race dynamics (perhaps because the stakes are 
lower). We consider the most cutthroat campaigns—usually national elections—to establish the limit case. 
Furthermore, we acknowledge that strategies like pandering and mudslinging in competitive campaigns are not 
directly analogous to taking performance-enhancing drugs before competing in a cycling race: the latter confers a 
demonstrable advantage in a way that the former does not. However, many candidates plausibly believe that certain 
dishonest campaign tactics confer substantial advantages, and the task of campaign ethics is to consider how they 
should respond, given that reasonable belief. 
9 For a more general treatment of the prospects of normative theory in an evolving ecosystem defined by participants’ 
strategic choices, see Bagg 2017, 272–74. 
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allow her opponents to use such tactics to their advantage. Instead, her first response should be 
directed at undermining their effectiveness. Perhaps she will only need to highlight their unethical 
nature, enforcing norms against them via informal means; or perhaps she will need to strike an 
agreement with her opponents, with the aim of preventing an arms race.10 Just like the ethical 
businessperson, the ethical candidate should not only abstain from destructive tactics but should 
also seek to reduce the electoral “profitability” of those tactics. 
At this point along the continuum, however, two differences emerge between elections and 
other adversarial institutions. First, in the context of sports, law, and business, there is an (ideally) 
unbiased third party to adjudicate disputes about infractions—a role with no direct analog in 
democratic politics. As such, where the ethical businessperson can lobby for centralized 
enforcement as a last resort—and can negotiate for self-regulation in the shadow of this 
possibility—the ethical candidate cannot. Centralized enforcement of campaign norms is not 
strictly impossible, but giving regulators the power to silence or disqualify candidates on the basis 
of campaign discourse could seriously endanger the open, pluralistic society that elections are 
supposed to protect. It is a cure for the excesses of competition that is worse than the disease. As 
a result, the last resort of athletes, lawyers, and businesspeople is unavailable to candidates in 
democratic elections: arms races must be averted without the help of referees, judges, and 
regulators.  
The second difference between campaigns and other adversarial institutions is that a 
candidate’s “incentives” for winning may be moral, as well as material. If the attempts of an athlete 
or businessperson to implement informal norms or formal regulations against a destructive practice 
                                                          
10 According to Galston (1991), this is exactly what nine candidates running for mayor of New York City did during 
the 1989 campaign, when they created a nonpartisan Committee on Decent Unbiased Campaign Tactics “to avoid 
appeals based on race, ethnicity, and other emotional divisions among the electorate” (192). Galston suggests that the 
committee was at least somewhat effective.  
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are unsuccessful, after all, we would still think it wrong to participate in that practice. As long as 
her reasons for doing so are primarily material (or self-interested), rather than moral (or other-
regarding)—which is usually true of athletes and businesspeople—her moral imperative to quit or 
close up shop is fairly clear. In electoral campaigns, however, a candidate’s reasons for employing 
a particular tactic may themselves be moral. If the election has significant normative consequences, 
the question of whether or not to engage in the destructive behavior is a question internal to ethical 
theory. As a result, we cannot responsibly tell candidates to “quit” the competition, which we 
would usually advise athletes and businesspeople to do in similar circumstances. 
Given these two differences, the key question that emerges regarding “dirty” campaign tactics 
is whether they are likely to be effectively constrained through informal, decentralized sanctions. 
Because formal rules are unavailable as a means of regulation, yet we cannot tell ethical 
competitors to quit, we must rely on such sanctions to prevent arms races. If they are at least 
plausibly effective, then the ethical responsibility of candidates is to ensure they are enforced; that 
is, make the dirty tactics unprofitable. If an arms race will ensue regardless, however, then 
candidates with important substantive goals may be excused for using some dirty tactics. If such 
tactics are effective, indeed ethical candidates may have a responsibility to use them. 
The Challenges of Informal, Decentralized Enforcement 
In practice, there are two kinds of obstacles to effective informal sanctions against many 
destructive campaign behaviors. Some are inherent to the ambiguity of the norm in question, and 
others result from the costs of sanctions. Sometimes norms are difficult to enforce because it is 
genuinely hard to tell what counts as an infraction, in other words, and sometimes the challenge is 
that those meant to enforce the norm have significant incentives not to do so. In many cases, of 
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course, it is the combination of these two challenges that renders norms particularly difficult to 
enforce via informal, decentralized means.11 
Consider the difference between handshake conventions and norms prohibiting romantic 
advances in the workplace. The latter are ambiguous, first of all, in a way that the former are not. 
Barring exceptional circumstances, no one will disagree about whether Al has offered Betty his 
left or right hand, but there may be great disagreement about whether a particular action of Al’s 
counts as sexual harassment or harmless flirtation—even among people who agree about the 
wrongness of sexual harassment in general. This ambiguity does not preclude the possibility of 
decentralized enforcement altogether, but it clearly makes coordination more difficult. Second, the 
sanctions that accompany handshake conventions are not typically very costly. When they are—
as is often the case with sexual harassment—even people who desire to enforce a norm in general 
may be reluctant to do so in particular cases. A senator, for instance, might sincerely believe that 
sexual harassment is wrong and may even enact sanctions against it in other circumstances, yet 
still look the other way when her partisan ally is accused of wrongdoing.12 
Such straightforward hypocrisy is surely an important obstacle to decentralized enforcement 
of campaign norms as well. Imagine, for example, that a candidate clearly violates a norm. The 
only certain way to sanction him for doing so is to withdraw support or take action that will cause 
others to withdraw their support. Those who already support other candidates cannot withdraw 
their support from the violator, of course, and they already have ample incentive to induce others 
to do so. Among those who share the violator’s substantive goals, meanwhile, implementing 
                                                          
11 Other difficulties may arise if not everyone endorses the norm in question. Here, however, we assume full 
endorsement in order to isolate obstacles to enforcement that are inherent to the norm itself. 
12 The relevant “costs” here may be moral or material: to speak of costs simply means that applying sanctions yields 
outcomes contrary to the actor’s preferences, which may be self-interested or other-regarding.  
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sanctions will come at significant substantive cost. In many cases, this kind of sacrifice will not 
seem worthwhile. 
Drawing on the example of Venezuela’s descent into authoritarianism, Milan Svolik (2018) 
shows that this is a key reason why polarization threatens the maintenance of political norms. 
Svolik’s survey experiment with Venezuelan voters supports the predictions of his formal model 
(and of common sense): if there are more people in the ideological “center,” then there are more 
people—elites and ordinary citizens alike—who will be willing to sanction violators by switching 
their support. In a polarized society, however, the threat of this kind of punishment is less credible, 
because switching one’s support will typically require a greater sacrifice in substantive terms. 
Of course, this account considers only the most straightforward mechanism through which 
polarization might make norm enforcement more difficult. Svolik assumes that everyone agrees a 
violation has occurred and that everyone considers the violation to be destructive. Polarization 
comes in only after these facts have been established, giving partisans incentives to consciously 
ignore the violation. In real political life, however, polarization is also likely to cause problems for 
norm enforcement well before this juncture, by intensifying entirely genuine disagreements about 
what counts as a norm violation in the first place (Ahlquist et al. 2018). 
According to a wealth of research about the phenomenon known as “motivated reasoning” 
(Kunda 1990) or “identity-protective cognition” (Kahan et al. 2007), for instance, human beings 
systematically underconsume and undervalue information that contradicts our prior commitments 
and group identities (Bartels 2002; Lodge and Taber 2013). We do not seek out such information 
and, even if we are exposed to it, we are likely to ignore it, discredit it, or underestimate its 
importance—and then forget about it later. On the one hand, then, the information partisans receive 
will be quite different; and on the other hand, the way they interpret that information will also vary 
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widely. Our prior commitments and group identities thus profoundly shape the way that we 
genuinely perceive the world—and in a polarized society, partisans of opposing camps are often 
likely to disagree in entirely sincere terms about whether norms have been violated (Bagg 2018a).  
This outcome is all the more likely, of course, as the ambiguity of the norms in question 
increases, thereby making motivated reasoning more difficult to detect and counteract. Ambiguity 
also gives plausible deniability to those who are consciously underenforcing, like the senator who 
ignores her colleague’s misdeeds. Given the difficulty of norm enforcement even when the 
violation is clear, this problem is only exacerbated the more room there is for disagreement about 
what counts as a violation. As a result, norms governing campaign discourse will be extremely 
fragile. Commitment to them must outweigh powerful substantive concerns and identity loyalties, 
which distort our ability to enforce norms in both conscious and unconscious ways.  
We do not mean to suggest that it is impossible to sustain any norms of political discourse in 
the context of campaigns. Norms against incitement to vigilantism and political violence, for 
instance, are effectively enforced in most stable democracies. Black activists outraged by 
racialized police violence and mass incarceration almost universally disavow the logic and rhetoric 
of extrajudicial revenge, as do the vast majority of antiabortion activists convinced that federal law 
authorizes a genocide of the unborn. Calls for illegal violence are rare, and when they do occur, 
those who make them are marginalized even by their allies. The same can usually be said for norms 
against threats to undermine the integrity of elections or the rule of law, as well as certain forms 
of discourse that explicitly target racial and ethnic minorities. In other words, some campaign 
norms are enforceable, even in difficult circumstances. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate 
the difficulty of enforcing them. Sustainable enforcement requires that people who disagree on 
nearly everything else must not only agree about what counts as a violation but also coordinate on 
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effective sanctions. When enforcement works—which it does, for certain violations, in all 
functioning democracies—we should celebrate it as the fragile achievement it is. 
Against an Abstinence-Only Ethics of Campaigns and Elections 
We can now state more clearly and comprehensively our reasons for transcending the focus on 
honesty favored by extant accounts of campaign ethics. In brief, many of the deceptive practices 
they prohibit are so ambiguous that cross-partisan enforcement will likely prove impossible.13 It 
will be too difficult for people across the political spectrum to agree on what counts as a violation, 
much less coordinate on costly sanctions. Wherever the incentives favoring certain deceptive 
practices are substantial, therefore, we can expect some noncompliance with norms against them, 
potentially yielding an arms race (or “race to the bottom”). Given a commitment to freedom of 
expression—and a healthy skepticism, in particular, of empowering regulators to silence political 
leaders—ethical candidates cannot turn to centralized enforcement of norms. Yet given the high 
normative stakes of many elections, they also cannot morally justify abandoning the competition 
altogether. If decentralized sanctions fail to undermine the profitability of certain forms of 
dishonesty, therefore, we conclude that ethical candidates ought to be excused for committing 
some forms of campaign deception. 
To illustrate these claims more systematically, let us begin with the five deceptive practices 
prohibited by Eric Beerbohm—lying, bullshitting, pandering, mudslinging, and strategic 
ambiguity—which can fairly stand in for the range of honesty-focused guidelines offered to 
candidates by other campaign ethicists as well. We do not deny the prima facie ethical wrongs 
Beerbohm identifies with each of these practices. However, we submit that only a prohibition on 
                                                          
13 We are not claiming that these theorists have chosen the wrong norms to be enforced by decentralized regulation. 
Rather, we observe that they have not considered decentralized enforcement when establishing norms at all—and that 
this is problematic if one candidate in a competitive election does not follow the norms the theorist prescribes. 
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lying is plausibly enforceable through decentralized sanctions.14 If blatant and consequential 
enough, lies can be identified and condemned across ideological lines, just like calls to violence 
and certain racially discriminatory remarks. When these norms are well enforced, an ethical 
candidate faces no dilemma at all: she has ample reason not to lie. Even in cases where these norms 
have been weakened, however, and lying might help her achieve her other normative goals, the 
ethical candidate should still refrain from doing so. Since norms against lying are sometimes 
enforceable, her first responsibility is to revive them—and lying clearly undermines that goal. 
 In the case of the other four behaviors Beerbohm classifies as morally off-limits, however, 
coordination on sanctions will be much more challenging, and this changes candidates’ ethical 
calculus. Consider that it is difficult enough for two people with very similar substantive views to 
agree about whether a candidate has engaged in these practices. Generating enough agreement 
about such questions to induce coordinated sanctions across the political spectrum is very likely 
impossible. And although it is difficult to imagine circumstances where bullshitting would be 
essential to victory, it seems that candidates with valuable aims will sometimes be able to improve 
their chances of victory quite significantly by employing the other three strategies:  strategic 
ambiguity, mudslinging, and pandering. As a result, the choice about whether to employ them 
looks quite different, from an ethical perspective, from the choice about whether to lie. Outright 
lying to voters is rarely if ever excusable, but ambiguity, mudslinging, and pandering might be. 
We may consider the cases of ambiguity and pandering together. As a wealth of evidence 
demonstrates, ordinary voters are astonishingly poorly informed about both substantive issues and 
the track record of individual candidates (Achen and Bartels 2016; Somin 2013). Their policy 
                                                          
14 Beerbohm would not necessarily deny this. For him, as for other campaign ethicists, enforcement is beside the point. 
Yet given the goal of providing useful action guidance to candidates—especially those whose opponents use a win-
at-all-costs approach—campaign ethicists ought to care more about enforcement. Otherwise, as we demonstrate in 
this section, they risk making recommendations that are ethically irresponsible. 
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“preferences” exhibit little coherence across issues and only weak consistency over time, changing 
dramatically depending on the framing of the question. The problem of incoherence, meanwhile, 
only gets worse when considering dilemmas of social choice and the aggregation of preferences 
(Ingham 2018; Riker 1982). As individuals and as a society, it seems, we want contradictory 
things—better services and lower taxes, more security and stronger civil liberties—and who can 
blame us? Yet politicians will ultimately be called on to make choices between these priorities. 
On the one hand, candidates can be fully honest about the trade-offs and uncertainties they face 
in making policy, presenting the same platform in the same precise way for every audience. On 
the other hand, they can remain strategically ambiguous about the finer points of policy while 
expressing hopeful optimism about their ability to solve problems, emphasizing different aspects 
of these hopes and dreams for different audiences. Given the typical behavior of voters, candidates 
who adopt the first strategy risk losing many supporters to candidates who adopt the second 
(promising better services and lower taxes, for instance). Where candidates must appeal to multiple 
audiences in multiple stages of an election, moreover—as in the American primary system—the 
problem is even more pronounced: the claims that resonate with one audience will differ 
substantially, by design, from those that appeal to the next. Without appealing to ambiguity or 
pandering, a perfectly honest candidate in such a system would seem to be at a huge disadvantage. 
Consider the common connotations of the words “politician” and “political” as meaning 
“slippery” or “ambiguous,” such that one who refuses to take a side is acting like a “politician” 
and dodging a question makes one’s answer “political.” This speaks not only to the frustrating 
quality of such tactics, of course, but also to their enduring effectiveness in democratic politics. 
Given what we know about voter behavior, it is unlikely that many voters will know or care about 
subtle differences between politicians’ utterances across various contexts, and this enables 
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politicians to get away with significant ambiguity.15 Given the divergent incentives they face in 
front of a wide range of different audiences, meanwhile, it is no surprise that many successful 
politicians maintain significant ambiguity or flexibility regarding their commitments.  
Similar concerns can be articulated regarding prohibitions on mudslinging. As with the most 
blatant forms of pandering, there is some debate about whether and when negative campaigning is 
effective (Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner 2007). Where it seems clear that it will not be effective, 
however, there is no ethical dilemma to speak of. Meanwhile, its sheer prevalence again belies the 
supposition that it always fails to achieve candidates’ goals. Whenever it appears to be effective, 
then, the candidate faced with a mudslinging opponent must choose between remaining on the 
defensive—and thereby accepting the “frame” proposed by her opponent (Lakoff 2004)—or going 
on the offensive herself, positing an alternative frame for voters to grab hold of. Again here, the 
correct choice in strategic terms is clear: by refusing to respond in kind to effective mudslinging 
by her opponents, she risks being uniquely tarred with damaging stigmas. As with ambiguity, 
refusing to engage in any mudslinging whatsoever could plausibly endanger a candidate’s chances 
of winning—and when it does, retaliation may be the most responsible course of action. 
If it were possible to enforce norms against strategic ambiguity, pandering, and mudslinging—
as it is with lying and calls to violence—this consequence might be averted. Unfortunately, this is 
not the case. Whether any given act counts as one of these deceptive practices, or as an acceptable 
form of rhetoric and opposition research, is often very ambiguous. Even among substantive allies, 
it will be very difficult to agree on whether violations have occurred. Coordination across party 
                                                          
15 Blatant pandering, of course, can sometimes be damaging to a politician’s reputation and electoral chances 
(McGraw, Lodge, and Jones 2002). If so, however, there is really no ethical dilemma. Meanwhile, we are skeptical 
that pandering is never beneficial. For one, there is a sliding scale here from the most obvious forms of pandering—
which may be detrimental—to the subtler ambiguities and differences of emphasis that are the bread and butter of 
every democratic politician. Given their identity-driven behavior, moreover, it seems to us that ordinary voters are 
highly unlikely to be both able and willing to hold politicians accountable for minor pandering infractions. 
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lines of mutual enmity and distrust will likely be impossible. We are left with a classic arms race, 
where those who eschew such strategies are placed at a significant disadvantage. 
In other adversarial contexts, there is always one fail-safe option for maintaining one’s ethical 
scruples: abandoning the competition altogether. What is at stake in at least some democratic 
elections, however, is not a gold medal or a bump in share price but matters of great normative 
importance. For this reason, we cannot simply say that candidates with valuable substantive goals 
should categorically refrain from ambiguity, pandering, or mudslinging, nor should they refrain 
from competing altogether. Both responses would significantly increase the likelihood that 
political power would be exercised by the least scrupulous actors. When there are morally 
important consequences for victory, therefore, any blanket prohibition on all forms of dishonesty 
will sometimes make for irresponsible recommendations. Instead, we claim that at least some 
forms of campaign dishonesty, under at least some circumstances, must be considered morally 
permissible (if not, in some cases, required). 
Which forms of dishonesty are these, and under what circumstances will they be rendered 
permissible? Most obviously, unsanctionable deception or mudslinging from opponents and their 
allies will typically make it permissible for candidates to respond in kind. However, there may be 
other excusing or justifying circumstances as well. In fact, we expect that most candidates most of 
the time will not be fully forthright—that is simply the way campaigns work—and it strikes us that 
even in the absence of specific, demonstrable instances of dishonesty by opponents, the demands 
of thriving within such an environment could plausibly serve as a general excuse for mild deceptive 
practices like pandering and ambiguity. Either way, the prevalence of such relatively trivial 
deception by candidates does not particularly concern us. On our “realist” account of democratic 
elections, after all, such commonplace deceptions represent minor distortions of a principal-agent 
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relationship between citizens and officeholders that was largely fictional to begin with. As a result, 
they do not represent particularly serious wrongs, and they may be relatively easily excused. We 
think campaign ethicists—and candidates themselves—should focus their normative attention 
elsewhere. Rather than further analyzing the permissibility of various deceptions in relation to 
various hypothetical excusing circumstances, therefore, we turn now to articulate our alternative 
approach to the ethics of campaigns and elections, which emphasizes pluralism rather than 
honesty. 
Toward a Pluralist Approach to the Ethics of Campaigns and Elections 
Just as the benefits deriving from other adversarial institutions excuse some but not all 
competitive behaviors within those contexts, an adversarial ethics of campaigns cannot simply 
excuse all behaviors undertaken in pursuit of ends supposed to have independent normative value. 
Indeed, that is exactly why we believe the topic is so important: candidates do need guidance in 
deciding how to run their campaigns. In formulating this guidance, however, we must account for 
what we have learned from the shortcomings of extant approaches. 
First, elections are fundamentally adversarial institutions, and this fact should be as central to 
the theory of campaign ethics as it is to ethical theories of sports, law, and business. Second, 
accounting for the adversarial nature of elections is especially difficult, because one of the tools 
available to adversarial ethicists in other domains—centralized enforcement—is unavailable in the 
context of campaigns. Where norms against certain dirty tactics are not likely to be enforceable 
through decentralized, cross-partisan sanctions, therefore, ethically proscribing those tactics will 
simply cede the political realm to the least scrupulous actors. Third, the focus on honesty favored 
by prevailing approaches to campaign ethics lends itself readily to such perverse consequences. 
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As a result, campaign ethicists should refocus their attention; both framing their questions 
differently and emphasizing different democratic values in response. 
From Honesty to Pluralism: Standing Our Ground Where It Matters 
Let us be clear that we do not suggest abandoning honesty altogether. Deceptive practices such 
as ambiguity, mudslinging, and pandering do degrade the relationship between candidates and 
citizens to some degree, and candidates should avoid them whenever possible. Nevertheless, these 
mild forms of dishonesty are not nearly as threatening to democracies as other campaign ethicists 
have assumed, and in the darker moments of competitive campaigns, we think there are far more 
important places for candidates to stand their moral ground. In particular, we think that the most 
pressing moral dilemma facing ethical candidates—the one that might actually keep them up at 
night—is how to weigh the demands of maintaining democratic institutions against the prospect 
of achieving normatively valuable substantive policies. As a result, we think that a theory of 
campaign ethics should address this dilemma head-on. In doing so, moreover, it should focus on 
preserving those things that are truly necessary to democracy.16 
On theories assuming that the purpose of elections is to enable ordinary citizens to “authorize” 
the laws through representatives conceived as agents of the people, of course, dishonesty by 
candidates does strike at the foundations of democracy’s value (Beerbohm 2012). However, the 
principal-agent model of representation implied by this ideal—whereby representatives respond 
                                                          
16 As an anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out, this means that our framing of the questions of campaign ethics 
largely switches at this point from that of discovering the limits of permissible behavior—which is preferred by 
previous campaign ethicists—to that of weighing conflicting political values (very roughly, “procedure” vs. 
“substance”). As we interpret them, however, the two frames ultimately reduce to the same considerations in this case. 
Candidates behave most responsibly—and, therefore, permissibly—when they properly prioritize between these two 
pressing normative demands. Meanwhile, they behave irresponsibly—and potentially impermissibly—when they do 
so improperly. Thus, a candidate who prioritizes substantive goals over the most important pluralist norms—
demonizing her opponents, for instance, to gain support for her policies—is behaving impermissibly: the damage to 
democracy is too grave. However, a candidate who prioritizes maintaining strict procedural norms of honesty over 
important substantive goals—thereby ceding the political field to the least scrupulous actors—also behaves 
irresponsibly (if not impermissibly): she fails to fight hard enough for justice. 
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to exogenous citizen preferences—has long been understood by political scientists as highly 
unrealistic, if not incoherent (Disch 2011; Mansbridge 2003). Countless surveys and experiments 
demonstrate that most citizens have no opinion at all on most policy issues and that the opinions 
they have are not well informed (Achen and Bartels 2016; Lodge and Taber 2013). Meanwhile, 
social choice theory has exposed profound difficulties with the very idea of a popular will, which 
would persist even if everyone did have well-formed opinions (Arrow 1951; Riker 1982; Weale 
2018). 
In light of these findings, we should cease trying to preserve an idealized agency relationship 
between citizens and their representatives that was deeply implausible to begin with. It is simply 
not the case that elections would enable the people to authorize the laws, were it not for the strategic 
ambiguity of candidates. Yet elections seem valuable nonetheless, and in our view, the reason for 
this has more to do with competition between parties than with the fantasy that representatives 
could ever be said to make laws “in our name.”17 We should still demand honesty from candidates, 
then, but it need not be our first priority. Other excesses of adversarial campaign competition are 
far more dangerous to democratic institutions. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to develop a comprehensive theory of campaign ethics, 
much less a complete picture of healthy democratic institutions. Building on recent scholarship 
across several distinct traditions, however, we observe that many of the most dangerous tendencies 
of electoral competition seem to share an “anti-pluralist” character. Acceptable forms of 
partisanship and competitive behavior cross a line and become dangerous to democracy, authors 
such as Nancy Rosenblum and Jan-Werner Müller argue, when they lose their fallibilistic 
                                                          
17 As we note earlier, we think competition is essential to democratic governance (Przeworski 1999; Schumpeter 
1942). This is not necessarily because political competition produces the best public policies, but because it makes it 
more difficult for any single party or group to capture state institutions (Bagg 2018b). For the idea that laws are or 
ought to be made “in our name”—which implies the principal-agent model we reject—see Beerbohm 2012. 
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character; that is, when they refuse to accept the legitimacy of disagreement. We suggest, therefore, 
that a focus on protecting social and political pluralism represents a more fruitful direction for 
campaign ethics: pointing out lines that might be tempting to cross in the name of valuable 
substantive goals, but that ethical candidates should nevertheless refrain from crossing. 
In her study of the ethics of partisanship, for instance, Rosenblum acknowledges that all 
partisans think they are right. Those she calls “extremists,” however, display “a deliberate and 
celebrated… single-mindedness,” which ignores the fact of pluralism and excludes certain groups 
from consideration altogether (Rosenblum 2010, 401). In his analysis of populism, similarly, Jan-
Werner Müller admits that all democratic politicians make claims on behalf of “the people.” Yet 
those he calls “populists” (in a necessarily pejorative sense) make an “exclusive” and “moralistic” 
claim to representation—that “they, and only they, represent the people” while opponents are 
necessarily “part of the immoral, corrupt elite” (Müller 2016, 20). Although often claiming to 
represent the people, by contrast, nonpopulists concede “that representation is temporary and 
fallible, that contrary opinions are legitimate, that society cannot be represented without remainder, 
and that it is impossible for one party or politician permanently to represent an authentic people 
apart from democratic procedures and forms” (40). Other recent accounts have stressed a similar 
exclusionary, moralistic logic as central to populism, linking it both theoretically and empirically 
to the erosion of democratic norms and institutions (Galston 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; 
McKean 2016). 
Given that the normative valence of populism is seriously contested, we prefer to describe our 
target as “extremism” or “anti-pluralism,” as in Rosenblum’s account, rather than “populism,” as 
Müller and others would have it.18 Regardless of the terminology employed, all of these authors 
                                                          
18 Many scholars prefer to distinguish between democratic and antidemocratic forms of populism, rather than 
designating all populists as antidemocratic; see Boyte 2010; Bretherton 2014; Grattan 2016; Mouffe 2018. 
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agree that the phenomenon in question is both endemic to electoral competition—in Müller’s 
words, it is a “permanent shadow of representative politics” (2016, 101)—and seriously 
threatening to democracy. The logic of exclusive or direct representation suggests an all-too-
recognizable set of polarizing strategies, which have proven frustratingly effective throughout the 
history of representative democracy and have been deployed by opportunists from a range of 
ideological backgrounds. The notion that one’s opponents and their supporters are illegitimate and 
morally corrupt—perhaps not even part of the “real” people—has too often served as a potent 
justification for dismantling independent checks on centralized power (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 
72–96; Müller 2016, 44–49).  
We propose that a more fruitful approach to campaign ethics would be oriented toward averting 
these dangers. Given its effectiveness in certain contexts, even candidates with valuable 
substantive goals may be tempted by hyperpolarizing, anti-pluralist rhetoric. Despite these 
temptations, a pluralist approach asks candidates to conscientiously address their arguments to the 
entire political community, thereby making themselves at least minimally accountable to all groups 
within that community. Some degree of polarization can be advantageous or even necessary in the 
fight for substantively valuable ends, but it can also make norm enforcement more difficult and, 
in some cases, slide into outright anti-pluralism. As a result, we maintain that ethical candidates 
should seek to minimize this polarization as much as they can and make conscious efforts to 
“depolarize” where possible.19 Meanwhile, genuinely anti-pluralist strategies must remain off-
limits, even when the substantive stakes are very high.  
For instance, candidates must vigorously attack their rivals—not only criticizing their policy 
positions but also highlighting their character flaws, unearthing past indiscretions, and exposing 
                                                          
19 For a discussion of how community organizers use strategic polarization to achieve their goals—always followed 
by active efforts at depolarization—see Stout 2012. 
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corrupt backroom bargaining. In doing so, however, they should accept the legitimacy of opposing 
politicians and refrain from demonizing them, casting them as morally corrupt outsiders in contrast 
to a morally pure in-group. Moreover, this license to attack one’s political rivals does not extend 
to the ordinary people whose only vice is supporting those politicians. In particular, ethical 
candidates should not refer to their opponent or her supporters as “enemies” or label either as 
existential threats to the well-being of the political community—even when one suspects they 
might be.20 Such claims are particularly problematic (and deserving of sanction) when the targeted 
person or group can be identified by ascriptive characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, gender, and 
sexual orientation. Furthermore, we argue that it is not enough to refrain from attacking an 
opponent’s supporters: even just ignoring a group can imply that its members do not deserve 
consideration as part of the polity. Instead, ethical candidates should work to include partisan 
opponents in their audience—answering their concerns and asking for their support—even if they 
recognize that such appeals are unlikely to be effective.21 Finally, ethical candidates should not 
pursue electoral strategies based on demobilizing opposition voters or discouraging participation 
in the democratic process more generally. 
These demands are fairly extensive, of course, and we might wonder whether they overstep 
the bounds of campaign ethics, which ought to govern how people pursue their goals rather than 
which goals they pursue. Following our guidelines would seem to prevent ethnonationalist 
candidates, for instance, from presenting their ideas at all: even if they were perfectly willing to 
abide by the results of elections and adhere to other norms of democratic life, our account would 
                                                          
20 Inevitably, there will be exceptions here in very extreme cases. For discussion, see Kirshner 2014. 
21 This does not mean pandering to ethnonationalists, for instance, by condoning racist beliefs or capitulating to their 
demands. Rather, it means offering a different interpretation of their concerns—highlighting whatever might be 
legitimate within them—and defending one’s political platform as the best response to those charitably interpreted 
concerns. This may simply be impossible with certain populations: as noted earlier, these guidelines may need to be 
suspended in certain extreme cases. But we think such cases are quite rare, even in societies, like the United States 
that are deeply structured by racism. 
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rule large swaths of their substantive platform out of bounds as a violation of campaign ethics. 
Even if we find their views repugnant in a broader sense, therefore, the objections we make may 
appear not to fit within the scope of campaign ethics.22 
This objection, however, depends on a strict separation between values of social pluralism—
concerning an inclusive society—and political pluralism—concerning open democratic 
procedures—which cannot be sustained. On the one hand, we think that the former is just as central 
to the value of democracy as the latter: the benefits of competition between parties are seriously 
undermined if some members of society are excluded from the audience, such that their interests 
may be entirely ignored.23 On the other hand, the work of scholars such as Rosenblum, Müller, 
and Levitsky and Ziblatt has revealed a clear connection in practice between the two forms of anti-
pluralism, which we would be unwise to ignore. Candidates who reject “social” pluralism often 
reject “political” pluralism as well, if and when they gain enough power to ban competing 
candidates or parties. This is no coincidence: as Müller argues, it is written into the “inner logic” 
of anti-pluralist forms of populism (2016, 10–11). Although we cannot predict the outcome with 
certainty, it seems reasonable to suppose that candidates who continually demonize a particular 
religious or ethnic group as enemies would curb its formal political power if they could.24 
Three Advantages of a Pluralist Approach 
This preliminary sketch of a pluralistic approach to campaign ethics is only suggestive, of 
course, but we now have a clear enough picture to appreciate its key advantages over alternatives 
                                                          
22 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
23 Famously, this is a key flaw with Schumpeter’s account of democracy, and it is one reason we are not 
Schumpeterians in any strong sense. 
24 In theory, one could embrace fallibilism at the level of political institutions but not in social matters. Yet given the 
threat posed by political anti-pluralism to open democratic competition, and the close historical relationship between 
social and political anti-pluralism, we believe that at least some forms of social anti-pluralism must be definitively 
off-limits—even from within the limited perspective of campaign ethics. 
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focused on honesty. First, pluralist norms are easier to enforce through decentralized sanctions. 
Second, even if these sanctions fail, candidates who follow pluralist norms are still less likely to 
seriously harm their electoral chances, and for both of these reasons, following them will less often 
generate perverse results. Third and finally, upholding pluralist norms is far more important for 
democratic politics. Thus, even if candidates lose votes by refusing to engage in anti-pluralist 
tactics, their sacrifice serves a worthy cause, and not an ideal that was hopeless to begin with. 
Let us begin with the question of perverse results. As we have seen, existing approaches to 
campaign ethics seek to prohibit a wide range of deceptive practices, yet only the most 
unambiguous violations—blatant lies and perhaps the most egregious forms of pandering—are 
effectively preventable through cross-partisan sanctions. Given the very significant advantages to 
be gained through subtler forms of dishonesty and ambiguity, we have argued that refraining from 
such behaviors in the absence of broader enforcement mechanisms will often do serious damage 
to the electoral chances of ethical candidates.  
The norms of pluralism we propose do not have the same effect. On the one hand, our account 
licenses certain forms of dishonesty, which gives ethical candidates a fighting chance in even the 
must cutthroat campaigns. On the other hand, upholding pluralism is not always or necessarily 
costly in the first place. Whereas ambiguity has almost no strategic downsides, anti-pluralist tactics 
can carry their own risks. We do not deny that those tactics are sometimes effective, even for 
candidates with valuable substantive goals; otherwise, there would be no genuine dilemma. 
However, their efficacy is far from guaranteed, and especially in the face of an anti-pluralist 
opponent, affirming pluralist values is not an obviously inferior response. (Compare this to the 
hapless candidate discussed earlier, who frets openly about the trade-offs between tax cuts and 
service provision while her carefree opponent promises the world). Addressing one’s arguments 
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to the entire political community rather than firing up one’s base by demonizing the enemy may 
come with costs, but it may also have benefits, and in the face of this strategic uncertainty, it is 
ethically responsible to err on the side of pluralism. 
In addition, of course, many pluralist norms are more amenable to cross-partisan sanctions than 
norms of honesty. Consider, for instance, that during the 2012 US presidential race, Republican 
nominee Mitt Romney was criticized widely, even within his own party, for calling 47% of 
American citizens “takers.” The same thing happened four years later on the Democratic side, 
when Hillary Clinton sustained broad criticism—again, crucially, from many within her own 
party—after labeling many of her opponent’s supporters a “basket of deplorables.” Both Romney 
and Clinton backed away from their comments and did not make similar statements in the 
remainder of their campaigns. At least in these cases, decentralized, cross-partisan enforcement of 
pluralist norms seems to have worked—just as coalitions reliably mobilize within functioning 
democracies to marginalize actors who incite political violence. 
To be sure, pluralist norms are hardly uncontestable—and as such, they will not always be 
enforceable by decentralized means. Indeed, many observers believe that we have recently 
witnessed a widespread breakdown of these norms in a number of countries around the world. Yet 
the very thesis of breakdown implies a prior state in which the norms were more reliably enforced. 
A lapse in enforcement is not evidence of structural unenforceability, but of a need to revive the 
conditions supporting more reliable enforcement—and that is precisely what our guidelines 
recommend. When sanctions fail—as they often do—this is not because enforcement is 
impossible, as is the case for mild forms of deception. Even in the name of valuable substantive 
goals, therefore, ethical candidates should not simply abandon these norms at the first sign of 
erosion. Given the threat that anti-pluralist tactics pose to democracy—and thus to a future in 
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which substantively valuable goals may be safely pursued—candidates and their supporters must 
work to defend pluralist norms by abandoning any candidates who are responsible for that erosion, 
regardless of their substantive priorities. As demonstrated by the earlier examples, this can be an 
effective response in its own right. Even when such sanctions appear to be ineffective, however, 
this forbearance will not represent a meaningless sacrifice on the road to an inevitable arms race. 
Because the norms in question are at least potentially enforceable, an arms race is preventable—
at least in the long run—and attempting to reinstate the norms is essential to its prevention.25 
Even if there is deep and seemingly unending contestation about the meaning and scope of 
pluralism, this is not necessarily a fatal blow to our account. After all, it was motivated in the first 
instance by a desire to address a set of concerns that were more significant for the health of 
democracy, and in that context, continuing contestation can be a feature, not a bug. Put otherwise, 
our account directs attention to curbing the behaviors that are most harmful to democratic forms 
of government, and if what results from this increased attention is increased discussion and 
disagreement about what those behaviors are, then our goal will have been partially accomplished. 
Of the various advantages we have claimed for a pluralist theory, after all, this one is ultimately 
the most significant: it aims to preserve the real values of democracy. 
Conclusion 
In October 2018, while campaigning for Democrats in Georgia, former US attorney general 
Eric Holder offered a rebuttal to Michelle Obama’s soaring rhetoric from the 2016 Democratic 
Convention. “Michelle always says ‘When they go low, we go high,’” he said, before countering: 
“No. When they go low, we kick them”—quickly explaining that he did not mean anything 
                                                          
25 We emphasize again that we are not opposed to norm erosion as such. As Corey Robin (2018) writes, “Some norm 
erosion undermines democracy, some enhances it.” We believe that the norms of pluralism we have discussed, 
however, are fundamental to democracy. 
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“inappropriate” or “illegal,” but simply that “we have to be tough and we have to fight” (Hayes 
2018). In Holder’s view, in other words, “going high” is not always the right thing to do: in moral 
terms, the pursuit of substantive ends sometimes demands that candidates get their hands dirty. 
Doing so is not only excusable; it may also be the ethical candidate’s responsibility. 
In this article, we have offered some support for this view, and we have also articulated what 
it means for an ethical candidate to fight. Unlike previous theorists of campaign ethics, we maintain 
that “going high” is not always the right response for ethical candidates. In other adversarial 
circumstances, we often license behaviors that would normally be considered unethical, and this 
should apply to elections as well. When elections have important normative consequences, we 
should not ask ethical candidates to fight unscrupulous opponents with one hand tied behind their 
backs. At the same time, we agree with prior accounts that campaigns cannot simply be treated as 
an ethics-free zone. When ethical candidates contemplate using “dirty tactics” to help them achieve 
valuable substantive goals, they must consider the detrimental effects of those tactics on 
democratic norms and institutions—and some tactics must be considered beyond the pale 
altogether. (If Holder were calling for Democrats to adopt a win-at-any-cost approach, we would 
disagree with his exhortation). But our ethical calculations should be guided by a realistic 
conception of democracy’s value, and they should not doom ethical candidates to defeat. In 
response, we suggested an approach to campaign ethics that emphasizes social and political 
pluralism, allowing candidates to fight to win while nonetheless curbing the most destructive 
tendencies of competitive campaigns.
34 
References 
Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do 
Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ahlquist, John S., Nahomi Ichino, Jason Wittenberg, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. “How Do Voters 
Perceive Changes to the Rules of the Game? Evidence from the 2014 Hungarian 
Elections.” Journal of Comparative Economics 46 (4): 906–19. 
Applbaum, Arthur Isak. 2000. Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and 
Professional Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Arrow, Kenneth. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Baderin, Alice. 2014. “Two Forms of Realism in Political Theory.” European Journal of Political 
Theory 13 (2): 132–53. 
Bagg, Samuel. 2016. “Between Critical and Normative Theory: Predictive Political Theory as a 
Deweyan Realism.” Political Research Quarterly 69 (2): 233–44. 
Bagg, Samuel. 2017. “When Will a Darwinian Approach Be Useful for the Study of Society?” 
Politics, Philosophy & Economics 16 (3): 259–81. 
Bagg, Samuel. 2018a. “Can Deliberation Neutralise Power?” European Journal of Political 
Theory 17 (3): 257–79. 
Bagg, Samuel. 2018b. “The Power of the Multitude: Answering Epistemic Challenges to 
Democracy.” American Political Science Review 112 (4): 891–904. 
35 
Bagg, Samuel. 2018c. “What Makes a Political Theory Political? A Comment on Waldron.” 
Political Studies Review 16 (3): 184–91. 
Bartels, Larry M. 2002. “Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions.” 
Political Behavior 24 (2): 117–150. 
Beerbohm, Eric. 2012. In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Beerbohm, Eric. 2016. “The Ethics of Electioneering.” Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (4): 
381–405. 
Boyte, Harry C. 2010. Everyday Politics: Reconnecting Citizens and Public Life. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Bretherton, Luke. 2014. Resurrecting Democracy: Faith, Citizenship, and the Politics of a 
Common Life. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Connolly, William E. 1991. Identity, Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Disch, Lisa. 2011. “Toward a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Representation.” American 
Political Science Review 105 (1): 100–114. 
Dresden, Jennifer Raymond, and Marc Morjé Howard. 2016. “Authoritarian Backsliding and the 
Concentration of Political Power.” Democratization 23 (7): 1122–43. 
Galston, William. 1991. “Toughness as a Political Virtue.” Social Theory and Practice 17(2): 175–
97. 
36 
Galston, William. 2010. “Realism in Political Theory.” European Journal of Political Theory 9 
(4): 385–411. 
Galston, William. 2018. Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Grattan, Laura. 2016. Populism’s Power: Radical Grassroots Democracy in America. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Green, Jeffrey Edward. 2009. The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hayes, Chrystal. 2018. “Eric Holder Says Michelle Obama Was Wrong: ‘When They Go Low, 
We Kick Them.’” USA Today. 
Heath, Joseph. 2006. “An Adversarial Ethic for Business: Or When Sun-Tzu Met the Stakeholder.” 
Journal of Business Ethics 72 (4): 359–74. 
Hellmann, Jessie. 2016. “Clinton: ‘Ugliness,’ and ‘Bigotry’ the Best Trump Can Do.” The Hill, 
http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/296252-clinton-calls-trumps-
birther-comments-as-ugly-and-bigoted. 
Ingham, Sean. 2018. “Why Arrow’s Theorem Matters for Political Theory Even if Preference 
Cycles Never Occur.” Public Choice 1–15. 
Kahan, Dan M., Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic, and C. K. Mertz. 2007.  “Culture and 
Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception.” 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 4 (3): 465–505. 
37 
Kirshner, Alexander S. 2014. A Theory of Militant Democracy: The Ethics of Combating Political 
Extremism. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Kirshner, Alexander S. 2016. “Legitimate Opposition, Ostracism, and the Law of Democracy in 
Ancient Athens.” Journal of Politics 78 (4): 1094–1106. 
Kunda, Ziva. 1990. “The Case for Motivated Reasoning.” Psychological Bulletin 108 (3): 480–
498. 
Lakoff, George. 2004. Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate—
The Essential Guide for Progressives. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green. 
Lau, Richard R., Lee Sigelman, and Ivy Brown Rovner. 2007. “The Effects of Negative Political 
Campaigns: A Meta-Analytic Reassessment.” Journal of Politics 69 (4): 1176–1209. 
Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. How Democracies Die. New York: Crown. 
Lipsitz, Keena. 2004. “Democratic Theory and Political Campaigns.” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 12 (2): 163–189. 
Lodge, Milton, and Charles S. Taber. 2013. The Rationalizing Voter. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Maisel, L. Sandy. 2002. “Promises and Persuasion.” In Shades of Gray: Perspectives on Campaign 
Ethics, eds. Candice J. Nelson, David A. Dulio, and Stephen K. Medvic, 39–60. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Maloy, Jason Stuart. 2013. Democratic Statecraft: Political Realism and Popular Power. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
38 
Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. “Rethinking Representation.” American Political Science Review 97 (4): 
515–528. 
McGraw, Kathleen M., Milton Lodge, and Jeffrey M. Jones. 2002. “The Pandering Politicians of 
Suspicious Minds.” Journal of Politics 64 (2): 362–83. 
McKean, Benjamin L. 2016. “Toward an Inclusive Populism? On the Role of Race and Difference 
in Laclau’s Politics.” Political Theory 44 (6): 797–820. 
Medearis, John. 2015. Why Democracy Is Oppositional. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Medvic, Stephen K., and Dale E. Miller. 2002. “Civic Responsibility or Self-Interest?” In Shades 
of Gray: Perspectives on Campaign Ethics, eds. Candice J. Nelson, David A. Dulio, and 
Stephen K. Medvic, 18–38. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.  
Mickey, Robert, Steven Levitsky, and Lucan Ahmad Way. 2017. “Is America Still Safe for 
Democracy?” Foreign Affairs (May/June). 
Mouffe, Chantal. 2005. The Return of the Political. London: Verso. 
Mouffe, Chantal. 2018. For a Left Populism. London: Verso. 
Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. What Is Populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Norman, Wayne. 2011. “Business Ethics as Self-Regulation: Why Principles that Ground 
Regulations Should Be Used to Ground Beyond-Compliance Norms as Well.” Journal of 
Business Ethics 102 (1): 43–57. 
39 
Przeworski, Adam. 1999. “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense.” In Democracy’s 
Value, eds. Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, p. 23-55. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam. 2010. Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam. 2018. Why Bother With Elections? Cambridge: Polity. 
Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of 
Democracy and the Theory of Social Science. San Francisco: Freeman Press. 
Robin, Corey. 2018. “Democracy Is Norm Erosion.” Jacobin, December 20,  
http://jacobinmag.com/2018/01/democracy-trump-authoritarianism-levitsky-zillblatt-
norms. 
Rosenblum, Nancy L. 2010. On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and 
Partisanship. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Schumpeter, Joseph. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. 
Shapiro, Ian. 1999. “Enough of Deliberation: Politics Is about Interests and Power.” In 
Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, ed. Stephen Macedo, p. 
28-38. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Shapiro, Ian. 2016. Politics against Domination. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 
Singer, Abraham. 2018. The Form of the Firm: A Normative Political Theory of the Corporation. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
40 
Sleat, Matt. 2016. “Realism, Liberalism and Non-Ideal Theory: Or, Are There Two Ways to Do 
Realistic Political Theory?” Political Studies 64 (1): 27–41. 
Somin, Ilya. 2013. Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Stout, Jeffrey. 2012. Blessed Are the Organized: Grassroots Democracy in America. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Svolik, Milan. 2018 “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue: Partisan Conflict and the 
Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents.” SSRN: DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3243470 
Weale, Albert. 2018. The Will of the People: A Modern Myth. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
